
What Drives Sudan War and Regional Hunger Roots?
By Darius Spearman (africanelements)
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The humanitarian emergencies across the African continent are reaching catastrophic, historic thresholds in 2026. In East Africa, the United Nations has issued urgent alarms regarding the rapid acceleration of the civil war in Sudan (un.org). Concurrently, the World Food Programme has warned that compounding instability and conflict have triggered the worst hunger crisis in northern Nigeria in nearly a decade (wfp.org). Over 17 million people in that region now face severe and critical food insecurity (wfp.org).
These current headlines represent more than sudden humanitarian shocks. They are the direct consequences of decades-long historical trajectories. By examining the deep-seated origins of Sudan’s military rivalry and northern Nigeria’s fragmented insurgencies, observers can understand the complex forces driving today’s geopolitical and humanitarian catastrophes. The rich history of Africa shows that modern struggles are deeply linked to unresolved past structural challenges.
The Janjaweed Legacy and Sudan’s Fragmented Power
The current civil war in Sudan erupted on April 15, 2023 (cfr.org). This conflict is a battle for total state control between two military entities that grew out of the same authoritarian regime. The war pits General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces against Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (cfr.org). The origins of the Rapid Support Forces lie in the early 2000s in Darfur (wikipedia.org).
Facing a rebellion by non-Arab groups in 2003, the dictatorial regime of Omar al-Bashir armed and mobilized Arab nomadic camel-herders, loosely known as the Janjaweed (wikipedia.org, wikipedia.org). These militias carried out widespread ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur (wikipedia.org). In 2013, President Bashir formalized the Janjaweed into the Rapid Support Forces (wikipedia.org). This parallel security force was designed to insulate his presidency from coup attempts by the regular army (wikipedia.org).
When a popular uprising threatened to overthrow Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the two generals arrested their former patron (wikipedia.org, wikipedia.org). However, rather than handing power to civilian authorities, they consolidated their own military junta (arabcenterdc.org). In October 2021, they staged a coup against civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, completely dismantling the democratic transition (arabcenterdc.org, wikipedia.org). The partnership eventually fractured over how to integrate the paramilitary force into the regular army, leading to full-scale war (cfr.org, theowp.org).
The Siege of El Obeid and the Weaponization of Food
The civil war has entered its fourth year of devastation. The conflict has recently escalated in Kordofan, particularly around the strategic state capital of El Obeid (un.org). The paramilitary forces have placed El Obeid under siege-like conditions (un.org). They have used relentless drone attacks to target markets, hospitals, school compounds, and water infrastructure (un.org, un.org). The strategic city currently hosts some 500,000 civilians (un.org).
In both Sudan and northern Nigeria, active combatants systematically block food and aid to weaken opponents. In Sudan, both military factions have deliberately blocked, looted, and delayed humanitarian truck convoys (actionagainsthunger.org). The army-controlled government has repeatedly revoked permits for cross-border humanitarian aid (actionagainsthunger.org). Meanwhile, the paramilitary forces have besieged agricultural centers and systematically looted food warehouses (actionagainsthunger.org).
This systematic weaponization of food has triggered an unprecedented starvation emergency. Formal famine has been confirmed in the Zamzam camp in North Darfur, as well as in Kadugli in South Kordofan (ipcinfo.org). Over 24 million people in Sudan now face acute food insecurity (wfp.org). This represents nearly half the population of the country (wfp.org). More than 70 percent of health facilities in conflict zones are entirely non-operational (unicef.org).
Sudan Crisis Human Toll (July 2026)
Data compiled from UN and humanitarian source monitoring.
Boko Haram and the Fractured Insurgency of Northern Nigeria
Just as Sudan’s conflict is tied to mutated military networks, northern Nigeria’s worsening food insecurity is directly linked to the historical fragmentation of religious extremism. This crisis did not appear overnight. The food insecurity currently gripping northern Nigeria is primarily driven by a long-standing Islamist insurgency (wikipedia.org). Formed in 2002 in Borno State by the radical cleric Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram began as an anti-Western preaching movement (wikipedia.org).
Following clashes with security forces and the extrajudicial execution of Yusuf by police in 2009, the group launched a brutal armed rebellion (wikipedia.org). Abubakar Shekau took control and initiated widespread violence to replace the secular state with an Islamic government (wikipedia.org). Boko Haram’s extreme violence against civilian populations, including fellow Muslims, eventually created severe internal rifts (wikipedia.org).
In 2016, the group fractured into competing factions (wikipedia.org, wikipedia.org). The faction aligned with ISIS became the Islamic State West Africa Province, led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi (wikipedia.org, wikipedia.org). Abubakar Shekau retained control over the original, highly violent faction until his death in 2021 (wikipedia.org). The violent competition between these factions in the Lake Chad Basin has terrorized farming and fishing communities for a decade (crisisgroup.org). This terror has forced millions of people off their arable land (crisisgroup.org).
The Sahelian Ecological Crisis and Worsening Starvation
What began as a localized insurgency in the northeast has metastasized across the northern belt of Nigeria. Over the last several years, the region has seen an escalation in armed banditry, mass commercial kidnappings, and violent herder-farmer clashes (actionagainsthunger.org). These latter conflicts have been heavily exacerbated by environmental shifts in the Sahel. The Sahel is a semi-arid transition zone that separates the Sahara Desert from the savannas to the south (wikipedia.org).
The Sahel spans 5,400 kilometers across Africa (wikipedia.org). It is one of the most climate-vulnerable regions globally, with temperatures rising faster than the global average (alliance-sahel.org, nih.gov). Climate-driven desertification has pushed nomadic pastoralists southward into lands traditionally cultivated by farming communities (actionagainsthunger.org). This ecological pressure has intensified competition for water and land, fueling intercommunal clashes and extremist group recruitment (alliance-sahel.org).
In July 2026, the UN’s World Food Programme issued an alarm following its Cadre Harmonisé food security analysis (wfp.org). The Cadre Harmonisé is a unified analysis framework managed alongside regional bodies to assess food insecurity across West Africa (fao.org). The data shows that over 17 million people across nine northern states are experiencing crisis levels of hunger (wfp.org). Many families suffer from historical economic exploitation, which leaves them without any financial cushions during bad harvest cycles.
Northern Nigeria Food Crisis Severity
The 17 Million Person Crisis Explained by IPC Hunger Phases
IPC Phase 3
Crisis Level
Significant food consumption gaps or depletion of livelihood assets.
IPC Phase 4
Emergency
Large food consumption gaps with very high acute malnutrition.
IPC Phase 5
Catastrophe
10,000 people in Borno State face extreme lack of food and starvation.
Gold, Weapons, and the International Networks Fueling the War
Sudan’s civil war is fueled by a transnational web of complicity where both factions trade natural resources for advanced weapons (africanarguments.org). The paramilitary forces rely heavily on the illicit gold trade to bankroll their operations (africanarguments.org, source-material.org). The United Arab Emirates is heavily accused of being the primary hub for smuggled Sudanese gold (africanarguments.org, source-material.org). The metal is flown on illicit routes through regional corridors, such as Juba and Chad, to be sold on the global market (africanarguments.org, source-material.org).
In exchange for this gold, external networks supply the paramilitary forces with advanced weapons (africanarguments.org, source-material.org). These weapons include military hardware, advanced drones, artillery, and air defense systems (africanarguments.org). In addition, Russia’s Wagner Group, operating under the name Africa Corps, has historically secured gold mining concessions in Darfur (source-material.org). These concessions were secured through Hemedti’s family mining business, Al Junaid (source-material.org).
This resource exploitation reflects Russia’s complicated history with African nations, where tactical partnerships often bypass local democratic interests. Wagner uses these gold profits to finance military campaigns elsewhere, while providing surface-to-air missiles to the paramilitary forces in Sudan (source-material.org). Meanwhile, the regular Sudanese army maintains its own lines of support from external backers, including Egypt, Turkey, and Iran (crisisgroup.org).
The Dehumanizing Lens: Race and Gender in the Conflict Zones
The violence in both regions is intensified by deeply rooted social hierarchies. The divide between “Arab” and “Black/African” in Sudan is a socially constructed racial hierarchy rather than a biological distinction (genocidewatch.com). Generations of intermarriage mean there are virtually no physical differences between these populations (genocidewatch.com, genocidewatch.com). Yet, “Arab” identity has historically carried higher social and political status, defined through cultural assimilation and ancestral claims to the Arabian Peninsula (genocidewatch.com).
During the Darfur genocide, government-backed Arab Janjaweed militias systematically targeted non-Arab indigenous groups, such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa (genocidewatch.com, genocidewatch.com). These groups faced systemic exclusion and dehumanizing racial slurs (genocidewatch.com). In 2026, the paramilitary forces continue to use these racial constructs to justify ethnic cleansing and land confiscation in Darfur (genocidewatch.com). Women and girls are disproportionately targeted for extreme violence in these campaigns (amnesty.org).
Humanitarian agencies have documented systematic gang rape, abduction, and sexual slavery used as weapons of war to humiliate and displace non-Arab populations (amnesty.org). Similarly, in northern Nigeria, Boko Haram has employed mass abductions of women and girls as a core tactical strategy (wikipedia.org). Hundreds of girls have been abducted from schools, forced to convert to Islam, and subjected to forced marriages or forced to serve as human shields (wikipedia.org).
The Global Funding Disparity
Average Humanitarian Funding Raised Per Person in Need (Comparative Analysis)
Source: Norwegian Refugee Council analysis of global aid distribution.
A Call for Aid Equity: Diaspora Mobilization and Policy Reforms
African humanitarian crises suffer from systemic underfunding and global media neglect (nrc.no, nrc.no, nrc.no). High-profile conflicts in Europe lead to a massive redirection of international aid budgets (nrc.no). For every dollar raised per person in need in Ukraine, just 25 cents were raised for people in the ten most neglected crises globally, most of which are in Africa (nrc.no). This disparity highlights a racial empathy gap in global humanitarian response (nrc.no).
In response, Black congressional leaders and African diaspora organizations have actively mobilized to demand policy reforms (afsc.org, washingtoninformer.com). The Congressional Black Caucus, led by Chair Yvette D. Clarke, has issued strong statements calling for urgent global action (washingtoninformer.com, washingtoninformer.com). They have demanded safe humanitarian access in Sudan and condemned external actors, such as the United Arab Emirates, for fueling the violence (washingtoninformer.com).
Diaspora advocacy groups have lobbied the United States Congress for the immediate passage of the Stand Up for Sudan Act (house.gov). This act would prohibit United States arms sales to foreign governments until they cease arming paramilitary forces in Sudan (house.gov). These efforts reflect historical Black solidarity movements, where civil rights organizations and Black churches partner to build global support for vulnerable African populations (afsc.org, washingtoninformer.com).
Conclusion
The escalating war in Sudan and the worsening hunger crisis in northern Nigeria are not isolated, sudden emergencies. Instead, they represent the culmination of unresolved historical grievances, decades of military and insurgent impunity, and the systemic weaponization of resources. As the war in Sudan enters its fourth year and northern Nigeria experiences its worst food crisis in nearly a decade, the international community’s response remains severely underfunded (wfp.org, wfp.org).
Addressing these compounding disasters requires more than short-term emergency aid. It demands a deep understanding of the historical and structural forces driving these conflicts, alongside sustained diplomatic efforts to end the fighting and protect vulnerable civilian populations. The global community must recognize that aid equity is not just a matter of charity, but a fundamental requirement for global justice.
About the Author
Darius Spearman is a professor of Black Studies at San Diego City College, where he has been teaching for over 20 years. He is the founder of African Elements, a media platform dedicated to providing educational resources on the history and culture of the African diaspora. Through his work, Spearman aims to empower and educate by bringing historical context to contemporary issues affecting the Black community.