Sudan War: Khartoum Battle, Crisis, Arms, Regional Tensions

By Darius Spearman (africanelements)

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Khartoum Battle Shifts Sudan Civil War Dynamics

After nearly two years of brutal fighting, the situation in Sudan has seen a significant shift. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have reportedly retaken control of central Khartoum, including the presidential palace. This marks a significant turning point in the devastating civil war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The SAF finalized its control over the city center and Khartoum International Airport around March 26, 2025, following intense and prolonged clashes (Africa File, March 27, 2025). This victory came after the capital had been under RSF control for almost the entire duration of the conflict.

SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan officially declared the recapture, signaling a potential new phase in this tragic conflict (Sudan’s military takes central Khartoum from RSF rebels…). However, the fight is far from over. SAF forces are still working to encircle remaining RSF fighters in the southwestern parts of Khartoum. The Jebel Awliya Bridge remains a crucial escape route for the RSF heading towards White Nile state. Furthermore, the RSF maintains a presence in Omdurman, Khartoum’s sister city across the Nile, continuing to launch drone strikes and shelling against SAF positions (Africa File, March 27, 2025; A New Phase in Sudan’s Civil War). Therefore, the recent gains in Khartoum represent a critical but incomplete victory for the SAF.

The Human Cost: Sudan Humanitarian Crisis Deepens

For the people of Sudan, our brothers and sisters, this conflict has created one of the world’s most severe humanitarian catastrophes. The fighting, particularly the long siege of Khartoum, has inflicted unimaginable suffering. Since the war began in April 2023, over 14.6 million people have been forced from their homes, a staggering number that underscores the scale of displacement (Africa File, March 27, 2025; A New Phase in Sudan’s Civil War). Now, an estimated 30 million people require urgent humanitarian assistance just to survive.

The situation is dire, with active famine warnings in five states, including the recently contested Khartoum (A New Phase in Sudan’s Civil War). During Sudan’s lean season in 2024, famine conditions (IPC Phase 5) affected 750,000 people, and tragic starvation deaths were reported (Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help – IRC). Compounding this, essential services like electricity and water remain cut off in many areas, including parts of Khartoum, now under SAF control, making recovery incredibly difficult (A New Phase in Sudan’s Civil War). The healthcare system has collapsed under the strain, with repeated attacks on hospitals and clinics—over 119 verified incidents between April 2023 and October 2024—alongside looting of supplies and severe staff shortages (Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help – IRC; Sudanese civil war (2023–present) – Wikipedia). Cholera outbreaks, made worse by flooding, have spread rapidly, claiming lives at rates far exceeding global averages (Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help – IRC). Consequently, the humanitarian aid appeal for 2025 has surged to $6 billion, reflecting the deepening crisis (A New Phase in Sudan’s Civil War).

Foreign Arms Sales Fuel Sudan’s Fire

The suffering in Sudan is tragically amplified by the involvement of outside powers, who seem more interested in strategic gains than in the lives of the Sudanese people. Both the SAF and the RSF have received weapons from various international actors, prolonging the conflict and deepening the misery. Russia, for instance, initially backed the RSF through its Wagner Group mercenaries. However, in 2024, Moscow apparently shifted its support towards the SAF, likely securing access to a coveted naval base on the Red Sea in return (Africa File, March 27, 2025; A New Phase in Sudan’s Civil War).

Other nations are also deeply involved. Turkey supplied the SAF with $120 million worth of Bayraktar TB2 drones in 2024, reportedly seeking access to Sudan’s rich mineral resources and strategic ports (Africa File, March 27, 2025; A New Phase in Sudan’s Civil War). Furthermore, Iran sent at least seven arms shipments to Sudan between December 2023 and July 2024, actions closely monitored by the U.S. State Department (Africa File, March 27, 2025). This influx of foreign weapons, alongside funding from Gulf states, has undoubtedly made a peaceful resolution much harder to achieve, essentially pouring gasoline on an already raging fire (Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? – RUSI).

Roots of Conflict: Understanding SAF vs. Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

To grasp the current tragedy, we need to understand who the main players are. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is the country’s official national military. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), on the other hand, is a powerful paramilitary group (Sudan: A Year Later – ACLED; Ongoing War in Sudan – Policy Center). The RSF’s origins lie in the notorious Janjaweed militias, infamous for their brutality during the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s. Its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” became a principal power broker in Sudan (Sudan: A Year Later – ACLED; Ongoing War in Sudan – Policy Center).

After dictator Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in 2019, the SAF (led by al-Burhan) and the RSF (led by Hemedti) initially shared power in a shaky transitional government. However, deep mistrust and competing ambitions festered. The breaking point came over plans to integrate the RSF into the regular army. Hemedti sought greater political power and autonomy for his forces, which al-Burhan and the SAF leadership strongly resisted (Sudan: A Year Later – ACLED; Sudanese civil war (2023–present) – Wikipedia; Ongoing War in Sudan – Policy Center). This power struggle, fueled by external meddling and unresolved issues from the Bashir era, ultimately exploded into open warfare in April 2023. The RSF has since relied on its established networks of Arab militias and often predatory control in regions like Darfur, while the SAF has increasingly mobilized Islamist groups and civilian militias to bolster its ranks (Sudan: A Year Later – ACLED; Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? – RUSI).

Darfur, in western Sudan, remains a critical and tragic dimension of this conflict. Its history is deeply scarred by the ethnic violence of the early 2000s, where Janjaweed militias (the precursors to the RSF) carried out horrific attacks against non-Arab communities, leading to accusations of genocide (Sudan: A Year Later – ACLED; Ongoing War in Sudan – Policy Center). The current civil war has seen the RSF reignite these ethnic tensions, leveraging its historical roots and alliances. Moreover, the fighting in Darfur now also involves clashes between different Arab militia groups, like the Salamat and Beni Halba, often manipulated by the RSF as they vie for land and resources (Sudan: A Year Later – ACLED; Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? – RUSI). This complex web of violence makes Darfur a major RSF stronghold and a center of extreme civilian suffering.

What’s Next? Power Plays and Regional Fears

Following its gains in Khartoum, the SAF appears focused on consolidating its power and trying to establish legitimacy. Plans reportedly include appointing a technocratic prime minister and potentially reopening the parliament (Africa File, March 27, 2025; A New Phase in Sudan’s Civil War). This move aims to present the SAF as the rightful governing authority now that it holds the capital. Al-Burhan, having co-led the transitional council after Bashir and played a key role in the 2021 coup, clearly seeks to solidify his position as Sudan’s leader, despite criticisms of his authoritarian tendencies (Sudanese civil war (2023–present) – Wikipedia; Ongoing War in Sudan – Policy Center; Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? – RUSI).

Meanwhile, the RSF, having lost the capital, is likely to refocus its efforts on controlling western Sudan, particularly Darfur and potentially Kordofan. This strategy could lead to a de facto partition of the country, with the RSF establishing its own governance structures built on local alliances and resource control (Africa File, March 27, 2025). International diplomatic efforts, led by groups like IGAD with support from Saudi Arabia and the US, continue but face immense challenges due to the deep fragmentation within Sudan and persistent foreign interference (Ongoing War in Sudan – Policy Center; Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? – RUSI). Sanctions against key figures have proven largely ineffective (Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? – RUSI). Additionally, the conflict risks spilling over, as seen in the rising tensions between Burundian and Rwandan forces operating nearby in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, threatening broader regional stability (Africa File, March 27, 2025). The future for Sudan, therefore, remains tragically uncertain.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Darius Spearman has been a professor of Black Studies at San Diego City College since 2007. He is the author of several books, including Between The Color Lines: A History of African Americans on the California Frontier Through 1890. You can visit Darius online at africanelements.org.