What is Driving the Red Sea Proxy War in Sudan?
By Darius Spearman (africanelements)
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The civil conflict in Sudan has taken a dangerous regional turn. On May 5, 2026, the military-led government of Sudan launched a formal accusation against its neighbors (sudantribune.com). Sudan claimed that Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates orchestrated a series of cross-border drone strikes (sudantribune.com). These unmanned aerial vehicles targeted Khartoum International Airport and critical military installations (sudantribune.com). The escalation has pushed Northeast Africa closer to a multi-state war.
In response, the Sudanese government immediately recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa (sudantribune.com). This drastic move signals a major breakdown in diplomatic relations in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates denied involvement, but military analysts remain highly concerned (sudantribune.com). The roots of this crisis stretch back through decades of colonial manipulation, resource theft, and regional rivalries. To understand the drone strikes of today, one must examine the history behind the headlines.
The Spark in the Skies: The May 2026 Drone Accusations
Sudanese officials presented what they called undeniable proof of foreign interference during a public press conference (sudantribune.com). Military leaders showed telemetry data recovered from a downed drone, marked with serial number S88 (sudantribune.com). This technical data showed the drone launched from Bahir Dar Airport in northern Ethiopia (sudantribune.com). Furthermore, physical analysis of the wreckage revealed components manufactured for the military of the United Arab Emirates (sudantribune.com).
The Sudanese government asserts that the United Arab Emirates is using Ethiopian bases to launch attacks (sudantribune.com). These specific drone strikes targeted crucial military hubs in Omdurman, Khartoum North, and Blue Nile State (sudantribune.com). Ethiopia quickly dismissed these accusations as entirely baseless (sudantribune.com). Instead, Ethiopian officials accused Sudan of harboring hostile regional fighters along the border (sudantribune.com). The United Arab Emirates also rejected the claims, calling them propaganda (sudantribune.com). This dangerous aerial escalation has turned a domestic war into a regional flashpoint.
Colonial Nile Water Allocations (1959 Treaty)
How water rights were split under colonial-era frameworks (in Billion Cubic Meters):
The Battle for the Nile: GERD and Colonial Water Treaties
To understand the tension between Sudan and Ethiopia, one must look at the Nile River. Egypt and Sudan share an existential reliance on this vital water source (egyptindependent.com). Egypt, in particular, depends on the Nile for ninety-five percent of its water needs (egyptindependent.com). Because of this dependence, upstream projects like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam create immense panic (egyptindependent.com). Sudan has shifted its alignment on the dam, often backing Egyptian concerns over water security (marefa.org).
The legal framework governing the Nile dates back to the colonial era. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1929 and the subsequent 1959 agreement divided the river (britishjir.org). These deals allocated almost the entire flow of the Nile to Egypt and Sudan (britishjir.org). They also granted Egypt veto power over upstream construction (britishjir.org). However, British colonialists wrote these treaties without the consent of upstream nations (marefa.org). Ethiopia rejects these old laws as completely non-binding (marefa.org). This water dispute forms the backdrop of the modern political divide.
The Contested Border: Al-Fashaga and the Gwynn Line Legacy
The physical border between Sudan and Ethiopia remains another historical wound. The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 attempted to define this boundary (hornreview.org). In 1903, British officer Major Charles Gwynn unilaterally drew the border line (tandfonline.com). This demarcation, known as the Gwynn Line, occurred without Ethiopian representatives present (tandfonline.com). This colonial boundary ignored native farming communities and seasonal patterns (tandfonline.com).
The fertile agricultural land of Al-Fashaga lay on the Sudanese side of the Gwynn Line (hornreview.org). Despite this, Ethiopian Amhara farmers lived and worked on the land for generations (hornreview.org). In 2020, while Ethiopia was distracted by internal conflict, the Sudanese military seized Al-Fashaga (hornreview.org). They expelled thousands of Amhara families and built fortifications (hornreview.org). This move caused deep anger in Ethiopia. The memory of this land grab continues to fuel the current border tension.
Gold and Guns: The UAE and the Rapid Support Forces
The involvement of the United Arab Emirates in Sudan is tied to resource extraction. Sudan is rich in gold, which serves as a primary currency of conflict. In 2017, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces took control of major gold mines (chathamhouse.org). The group smuggled this gold directly to Dubai (gisreportsonline.com). In the United Arab Emirates, the gold was laundered into the global market (gisreportsonline.com).
This “gold-for-guns” network has created immense wealth for the militia leaders (chathamhouse.org). Historically, Black communities have suffered under rising economic challenges that mimic this extraction of wealth. The relationship between the United Arab Emirates and the militia solidified during the Yemen war (chathamhouse.org). The militia sent thousands of fighters to support Gulf interests (chathamhouse.org). In return, the paramilitary group received advanced weaponry and financial support (chathamhouse.org). This network now sustains the current war effort in Sudan.
Sudan Displacement & Hunger Crisis (2026 Metrics)
From Janjaweed to Paramilitary: The Dark History of the RSF
The Rapid Support Forces did not emerge overnight. This group began as the “Janjaweed” militia in Darfur during the early 2000s (ushmm.org). The Sudanese government under Omar al-Bashir armed these Arab-majority groups (ushmm.org). Their mission was to crush non-Arab Darfuri rebels who wanted land rights (ushmm.org). The Janjaweed committed horrific atrocities, including mass killings and sexual violence (genocidewatch.com, ushmm.org).
In 2013, President Bashir formalized this militia into the state security apparatus (wikipedia.org). He renamed them the Rapid Support Forces and placed them under General Hemedti (wikipedia.org, wikipedia.org). In April 2023, the transition to democracy collapsed completely (wikipedia.org). The military and the paramilitary group could not agree on integration (wikipedia.org). This disagreement sparked a direct military showdown for total state authority (wikipedia.org). The historical struggles for democratic transition echo other shifts in national governance seen throughout global history.
The Threat on the Frontier: Tigray Fighters and National Security
Ethiopia’s concerns about Sudan are also linked to domestic security. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front dominated Ethiopian politics for nearly thirty years (hornreview.org). However, the federal government sidelined them in 2018 (hornreview.org). This tension eventually led to the brutal Tigray War from 2020 to 2022 (hornreview.org). During this war, tens of thousands of Tigrayans fled into Sudan (hornreview.org).
Ethiopia now fears that Sudan is harboring these battle-hardened fighters (sudantribune.com). Ethiopian officials claim that Sudan is training and arming Tigrayan ex-combatants (sudantribune.com). They believe these fighters are acting as mercenaries for the Sudanese military (sudantribune.com). A return of armed Tigrayan forces across the western border is a major threat (hornreview.org). It could reignite ethnic conflicts inside northern Ethiopia (hornreview.org). This fear explains why Ethiopia is highly defensive along the frontier.
The Gold-for-Guns Proxy Pipeline
Tracing the transnational economic networks feeding the war
Devastation on the Ground: The Severe Humanitarian Collapse
The true victims of this regional proxy war are the people of Sudan. Since the conflict began, fourteen million people have fled their homes (unhcr.org). Over four million of these individuals are refugees in neighboring countries (unhcr.org). The scale of displacement is unprecedented. Over nineteen million people are facing acute food insecurity (unocha.org). Famine has settled over parts of Darfur and Kordofan (unocha.org, reliefweb.int).
Systematic ethnic targeting has worsened this humanitarian tragedy. The paramilitary forces and allied militias are carrying out ethnic cleansing (hrw.org). They are targeting non-Arab communities such as the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa (hrw.org, hrw.org). These actions mimic the genocide of the early 2000s (genocidewatch.com). The violence has resulted in thousands of deaths and forced migrations (hrw.org). To understand the gravity of these displacement crises, one can look at the aftermath of conflict and how communities rebuild.
Grassroots Resilience: Emergency Response Rooms Take the Lead
Amidst the collapse of the state, local Sudanese civil society has stepped up. The neighborhood Resistance Committees led the 2019 revolution (wikipedia.org). After the war broke out, these committees formed Emergency Response Rooms (dt-global.com). These grassroots networks serve as the primary source of survival (dt-global.com). They run community kitchens and coordinate scarce medical supplies (dt-global.com).
Volunteers use basic mobile applications to organize aid delivery (dt-global.com). Their heroic efforts have gained international recognition, including a Nobel Peace Prize nomination (rightlivelihood.org). They are fighting for survival and resource control and exploitation patterns that have historically plagued vulnerable populations. Both military factions actively target these volunteers (dt-global.com). They view independent civil networks as political threats (dt-global.com). Despite the danger, these community-led groups remain the last line of defense against total collapse.
About the Author
Darius Spearman is a professor of Black Studies at San Diego City College, where he has been teaching for over 20 years. He is the founder of African Elements, a media platform dedicated to providing educational resources on the history and culture of the African diaspora. Through his work, Spearman aims to empower and educate by bringing historical context to contemporary issues affecting the Black community.
